Abstract: Nowadays, in spite of great amount of qualitative discussions in management about the teams' role, there are no formal models of team building and functioning. The paper considers the model, based on the concept of the reflexive game, which describes and explains team building in terms of hierarchy of agents' beliefs about types of each other. The analysis allows concluding that the stability of team is also possible under false consistent beliefs of its members. Formal model of the team building process leads to the corresponding management problem.
INTRODUCTION
During the last decades more and more attention in management, project management, social psychology, etc., is paid to the team activity of the organization's personnel. The team is understood as the collective (the community of people, who implement joint activity and possess common interests), which is able to achieve goals autonomously and coordinately under minimal control.
Two aspects in the definition of a team are essential. The first aspect is the goals' achievement; i.e. the terminal result of joint activity is the system-forming factor for the team. The second aspect -autonomy and self-coordination of activity -means that each member of the team demonstrates the behavior, which is required in the certain situation, i.e. the behavior, expected from him by the other team members.
Nowadays, in spite of the great amount of qualitative discussions in management about the teams' role, there are no formal models of team building and functioning. The paper considers the models, based on the concept of the reflexive game (Novikov and Chkhartishvili, 2003) , which describe and explain team building in terms of hierarchy of agents' beliefs about types of each other.
THE MODEL
Consider the set N = {1, 2, …, n} of agents. The strategy of the i-th agent is the choice of his action y i ³ 0, which requires Cobb-Douglas cost c i (y i , r i ) = r i j(y i / r i ), where r i > 0 is a type of this agent, which determines the efficiency of his activity, j(×) is a monotone convex function. Assume that the goal of agents joint activity is to implement the given . From the game-theoretical point of view one can consider agent's goal functions to be equal to negative total cost. Without loss of generality put R = 1. If the vector of types r = (r 1 , r 2 , …, r n ) is common knowledge (Myerson, 1995) , then, solving the optimization problem of cost minimization, each agent is able to find the optimal vector of action: Two types of information structures (r ij and r ijk ) and five options of the subjective game history (which are assumed the same for all agents) generate ten models, conventionally denoted 1-10 (see table 1). 
or he can, estimating actions of his opponents by (2), find his action, leading to the required sum of actions:
It is easy to verify, that procedures (2) and (3) are equivalent.
Under the information structure {r ijk } the i-th agent may, estimating actions of his opponents by (1):
find his action, leading to the required sum of actions:
After describing the models of the agents' decision making in static, consider the dynamics of their collective behavior.
DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR
Assume that at each step (time period) each agent makes his decision, based on the information only about the previous step. Denote I about the types of the opponents, which can lead to the observed game history,
Let the agents initially have some beliefs 0 i I , and beliefs are modified in accordance with the following procedure:
where t i γ -is a vector, which components -numbers from [0; 1] are interpreted as the "sizes of steps towards the current goal" and provide the convergence of (6). As the beliefs of each agent are described by the finite set of parameters r ij or r ijk , i, j, k Î N, then (6) defines "vector" procedure of the independent changes of the information structure components.
Now one has everything that is necessary to define the team correctly. Let's define a team as a set of agents, whose choices are in concordance with the hierarchy of their beliefs about each other.
RESULTS OF MODELS EXPLORATION
Model 1. Assume that the agent i has the information structure { r ij } and observes actions x -i of other agents. Denote the set of types of the i-th agent's opponents, which lead to the actions, chosen in accordance with (2), equal to the observed actions x -i : 
and his choice of actions will follow the procedure (2).
Model 2. Assume that the agent i has the information structure { r ij } and observes the cost с -i of other agents.
Denote the set of types of the i-th agent's opponents, which lead under the actions chosen in accordance with (2), to the observed cost c -i : W . Then the dynamics of the i-th agent beliefs is described by (8), and his choice of actions will follow the procedure (2).
Model 3. Assume that the agent i has the information structure {r ij } and observes the total cost c of the agents.
Denote the set of types of the i-th agent's opponents, which lead to the observed total cost c: W . Then the dynamics of the i-th agent beliefs is described by (8), and his choice of actions will follow the procedure (2).
Models 4 and 5 are described analogously to models 1 and 2. Model 6. Assume that the agent i has the information structure { r ijk } and observes actions x -i of other agents. Denote the set of types of the i-th agent's opponents, which lead to the actions, chosen in accordance with (4), equal to the observed x -i : 
and his choice of actions will follow the procedure (5), i.e.:
Model 6 is analogous to model 1, model 7 -to model 2 and so on, hence the detailed description of models 7-10 is omitted. Thus, from each agents' point of view in model 1 there are n -1 equations with n -1 variables, in model 2: n -1 equations with n -1 variables, in model 3: one equation with n -1 variables, in model 4: 2 (n -1) equations with n -1 variables, in model 5: n equations with n -1 variables, in model 6: n -1 equations with n (n -1) variables, etc.
THE EXAMPLE
Consider model 1 -the simplest among the introduced ten models -for three agents with separable quadratic cost functions: c i (y i , r i ) = (y i ) 2 / 2 r i . Then (7) leads to:
Let r 1 =1,8; r 2 = 2; r 3 = 2,2, and initial beliefs of the agents are the same and equals to 2,0. Optimal (minimizing objective total cost) is the following vector of actions: (0,30; 0,33; 0,37) .
Let the agents calculate by (2) actions of opponents, which minimize "subjective" total cost, then they compare observed and expected actions and change their beliefs proportionally to this difference with the coefficient of proportionality
This procedure converges to the vector of actions (0,316; 0,339, 0,345) Procedure (8) under the same initial point gives the following vector of actions: ( 0,318; 0,341, 0,341) under the following beliefs of the agents: r 12 = 1,93 < r 2 , r 13 = 1,93 < r 3 , r 21 = 1,87 > r 1 , r 23 = 2,00 < r 3 , r 31 = 1,05 > r 1 , r 32 = 2,2 > r 2 . Again, in spite of the incorrect beliefs, the situation is stable -expected actions coincide with observed actions.
The effect of the informational equilibrium stability (Novikov and Chkhartishvili, 2004) under incorrect beliefs has transparent explanation: the solution of the system of equations (7) is not unique. Let us define such situation as a false equilibrium. In fact, for example, in the case of two agents the system of three equations 
Note, that the transfer from model 1 to model 4 adds the information about the cost of the opponents and may narrows the set of the solutions. In the considered example unique simultaneous observation of agent's action and his cost allows to find agent's type unambiguously.
Consider In this case subjective equilibria is x 1 = 0,4614; x 2 = 0,5376. The observed actions form informational equilibria as they correspond to beliefs of the agents (satisfy the system of equations (14)).
The set of subjective equilibrium for the example in hand is presented in figure 1 . The bold point marks the initial beliefs, the rhomb marks correct beliefs, the arrow points the change in agents beliefs about each other. The system of equations (14) 
hence, under constant "steps" g trajectories will form lines, passing through zero. The angle of these lines is determined by the initial point (for example, any initial point, belonging to the bold line r 12 = r 21 / 2 in figure 2, leads to the true equilibrium).
This fact seems interesting from the informational management Chkhartishvili, 2003, 2004 ) point of view -given the terminal point, one can find the set of initial points, leading to this final point. If the equilibrium y * is arbitrary, then (17) impose n (n -1) restrictions on the informational structure. Moreover, if the true type of each agent is fixed, then one can find n (n -1) variables r ij , i, j Î N, i ¹ j. (17) is satisfied by the set of beliefs r ij , such, that r ij = r j for all i and j. Thus, the problem of the false equilibrium existence under the given vector of agents true types (r 1 , r 2 , …, r n ) is reduced to the problem of the uniqueness of solution for the system of equations (17), which consists of n (n -1) equations and the same number of unknown variables.
System of equations

CONCLUSION
Consideration of the game-theoretical model of team building allows concluding that the stability of the team may be achieved both in the true stable informational equilibria and in the false ones. Transfer from false equilibria to the true equilibria requires additional information. Thus, methods of efficient team building are: learning through joint activity and providing maximal communication and all the essential information.
